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Abstract
Differential privacy has emerged as a formal framework for protecting sensitive information in control systems.
One key feature is that it is immune to post-processing, which means that arbitrary post-hoc computations can
be performed on privatized data without weakening differential privacy. It is therefore common to filter private data
streams. To characterize this setup, in this paper we present error and entropy bounds for Kalman filtering differentially
private state trajectories. We consider systems in which an output trajectory is privatized in order to protect the state
trajectory that produced it. We provide bounds on a priori and a posteriori error and differential entropy of a Kalman
filter which is processing the privatized output trajectories. Using the error bounds we develop, we then provide
guidelines to calibrate privacy levels in order to keep filter error within pre-specified bounds. Simulation results are
presented to demonstrate these developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging technologies such as smart cities [1], intelligent transportation systems [2], and smart power grids [3]
all promise to improve user services with a data-driven approach. A unifying theme in these applications is the
reliance on user data in driving decisions about traffic routing, power generation, and other system behaviors.
Simultaneously, these data streams have been shown to be quite revealing about users, potentially disclosing their
daily habits [4] and their locations [5]. Thus there has arisen a need for user privacy. Given the need for data in
decision making, privacy must also preserve the usefulness of privatized data to its recipient.
In recent years, differential privacy has become a common framework for privacy of this kind. Differential privacy
started in the database literature [6] and is used to privatize database entries when database queries are made. More
recently, differential privacy has been extended to trajectories arising in systems and control in [7], where the goal
is to preserve the privacy of whole trajectories of data as they are generated.
Differential privacy is simple to implement because it merely requires adding noise to sensitive data (or functions
of sensitive data). Differential privacy has several other properties that make it useful in control system applications.
In particular, it is immune to post-processing and robust to side-information, which means that its privacy guarantees
are invariant under post-hoc transformations and that they are not weakened by much with the availability of
auxiliary information [6]. As a result, further computations can be performed once data is privatized without
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2harming differential privacy’s guarantees. Of course, adding noise changes the accuracy of these computations
relative to their noise-free counterparts, and the effects of differential privacy have been investigated in several
contexts, e.g., [6]–[11].
Data-driven systems must share data to run. In combination with the vulnerability of dynamic data streams, this
need has stimulated the use of differential privacy along with model-based state estimators to both protect sensitive
data and make useful control decisions in the presence of privacy. Differential privacy’s immunity to post-processing
means that state estimation and filtering can be performed freely without threatening the privacy guarantees of a
system’s data. The Kalman filter is a widely used state estimator which has been shown to improve the utility of
privatized data in various settings [7], [12]. One common approach to differentially private Kalman filtering is to
have systems add noise directly to system outputs; this approach is broadly termed “input perturbation,” because
individual systems add noise to the inputs of the Kalman filter. This approach has the advantage of privatizing all
data before it is ever shared, eliminating the need for a trusted aggregator.
In this paper, we are interested in privacy over long time horizons, as in smart grids and other systems that will
be active for a long time. We therefore consider a Kalman filter in steady state and we analyze the accuracy of
filtering private data under the input perturbation paradigm. We consider a system with discrete-time dynamics,
and we protect its state trajectory by adding noise to its outputs at each point in time. We quantify the effects
of privacy in two ways. First, we use differential entropy to quantify the information content of the privatized
output trajectories. Second, we investigate the practical effects of privacy by bounding the mean squared error of
an external observer’s estimate of the system’s states.
While the computer science literature has devised methods to calibrate privacy based on analyzing static data
[13], to the best of our knowledge, no such systematic study has been undertaken in the control theory literature
for trajectory-valued data. We therefore explore the relationship between privacy levels, the amount of information
revealed, and the accuracy of estimates based on privatized data. We do so in terms of system properties and
dynamics, thereby directly linking control theoretic information with privacy of system trajectories. Based on the
bounds we derive, we provide guidelines for selecting one’s privacy level based on the downstream filtering error it
induces. Through doing so, we provide the ability to calibrate one’s privacy levels based on conventional control-
theoretic concerns (i.e., filtering error), thereby enabling meaningful privacy calibration without requiring in-depth
knowledge of differential privacy. In addition, this paper differs from [7], [14] because those papers design private
filters, whereas we characterize a common Kalman filter setup rather than designing novel filtering strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the necessary background for differential
privacy and sets up the problem statement. In Section III, we outline the privacy implementation for our problem
and briefly review Kalman filtering. Section IV presents the first main results of the paper, which are bounds on
the differential entropy and MSE of state estimates based on private data. In Section V, we provide guidelines for
calibrating privacy levels based on pre-specified error bounds. Next, we present numerical simulations in Section VI,
and Section VII concludes the paper.
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3II. BACKGROUND ON DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we first briefly review the relevant privacy background as it pertains to private Kalman filtering
specifically, and we refer the reader to [7] for a complete exposition. Then we state the problem that is the subject
of the paper.
A. Review of Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a quantitative and statistical means of protecting data. Differential privacy makes it unlikely
that an adversary or eavesdropper can make high-fidelity inferences about individuals by looking at their privatized
data. It is enforced by adding noise to sensitive data (or functions thereof). Control theory provides many techniques
that compensate for noise, making differential privacy a natural choice in control-theoretic settings.
Differential privacy is immune to post-processing, which means that transforming private data does not harm its
privacy guarantees. In particular, filtering private trajectories does not degrade the protections of differential privacy.
The guarantees of differential privacy are also robust to mechanism knowledge, which means that adversaries do
not gain any advantage if they know the mechanism used to privatize data [6], [15].
In this paper, we consider a system with discrete-time dynamics. The state trajectory of the system is sensitive,
and therefore it needs to be protected. Denote the system’s state trajectory by x. The kth element of x is denoted
by x (k) ∈ Rn for some n ∈ N. The notion of differential privacy in this paper follows the definition of differential
privacy for trajectories introduced in [7]. Differential privacy can be used to ensure that an adversary is unlikely
to determine either the input or state trajectory of a system, and in this paper we implement differential privacy to
protect state trajectories.
In this work, we consider the so-called “input perturbation” approach to differential privacy. This means that a
system will directly add noise to its own outputs before sharing them, and this has the advantage of masking sensitive
data before it is shared. Formally, a system’s state trajectory will be made approximately indistinguishable from
other nearby state trajectories which that system could have produced; the notions of “nearby” and “approximately
indistinguishable” are formalized below in Definitions 1 and 2.
We consider vector-valued trajectories of the general form Z = (Z (1) , Z (2) , . . . , Z (k) , . . . ) , where Z (k) ∈ Rd
for all k. We also use the ℓp-norm ‖Z‖ℓp :=
(∑∞
k=1 ‖Z (k)‖pp
) 1
p
, where ‖.‖p is the ordinary p-norm on Rd. We
further define the set ℓdp :=
{
Z | Z (k) ∈ Rd, ‖Z‖ℓp <∞
}
.
The state trajectory x is contained in the set ℓ˜n2 , which is the set of sequences of vectors in R
n whose finite
truncations are all in ℓn2 . Formally, we define the truncation operator PT over trajectories according to
PT [x] =


x (k) k ≤ T
0 k > T
,
and we say that x ∈ ℓ˜n2 if and only if PT [x] ∈ ℓn2 for all T ∈ N.
A differential privacy mechanism makes adjacent trajectories produce outputs which are similar in a precise
sense. The choice of adjacency relation is a key part of any differential privacy implementation because it specifies
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4which sensitive pieces of data must be made approximately indistinguishable. To formulate differential privacy for
trajectories, we next define the adjacency relation over the space ℓ˜n2 defined above.
Definition 1. (Adjacency) Fix an adjacency parameter B > 0. The adjacency relation AdjB is defined for all
v, w ∈ ℓ˜n2 as
AdjB(v, w) =


1 ‖v − w‖ℓ2 ≤ B
0 otherwise.
△
Two state trajectories of the system are thus adjacent if the ℓ2 distance between them is not more than B.
Differential privacy must therefore make the system’s state trajectory approximately indistinguishable from all
others contained in an ℓ2-ball of radius B centered on its actual trajectory.
Next is a formal definition of differential privacy for dynamical systems which specifies the probabilistic guaran-
tees of privacy. To state it, we will use a probability space (Ω,F ,P). This definition considers outputs in the space
ℓ˜q2 and uses a σ-algebra over ℓ˜
q
2, denoted Σ
q
2, construction of which can be found in [7].
Definition 2. ((ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy) Let ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. A mechanism M : ℓ˜n2 × Ω → ℓ˜q2 is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all adjacent x, x′ ∈ ℓ˜n2 , we have
P [M (x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫP [M (x′) ∈ S] + δ for all S ∈ Σq2. △
At time k, the system has state x(k) ∈ Rn, with discrete-time dynamics
x(k + 1) = Hx(k) + w(k)
y(k) = Cx(k),
where process noise for the system is denoted by w (k) ∈ Rn and the matrices H ∈ Rn×n and C ∈ Rq×n are time-
invariant. The probability distribution of the process noise is given by w (k) ∼ N (0,W ), where 0 ≺ W ∈ Rn×n,
and all process noise terms are assumed to have finite variance. We assume that the matrices H , W , and C are
public information, representing, e.g., that the device producing outputs is of a known type.
At each time k, the system outputs the value y (k). Absent any privacy protections, the values of y could reveal
those of x over time, which would compromise the system’s privacy. Therefore, noise must be added to the system’s
output to protect its state trajectory. That is, y is what is shared, x is what is sensitive, and because y is a function
of x, we add noise to y to protect x. Calibrating the level of noise is done using the “sensitivity” of a system’s
output map, which we define next for the input perturbation privacy we use; we emphasize that, although the system
perturbs the outputs of its own dynamics, the “input perturbation” label applies because the system perturbs what
will become the inputs to a Kalman filter. The following bound is adapted from [7, Section IV-A].
Definition 3. (Sensitivity for Input Perturbation Privacy) The ℓ2-norm sensitivity of a system’s output map is
the greatest distance between two output trajectories which correspond to adjacent state trajectories. Formally, for
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5x, x′ ∈ ℓ˜n2 ,
∆ℓ2y := sup
x,x′|AdjB(x,x′)=1
‖Cx− Cx′‖ℓ2 . △
We can bound ∆ℓ2y via ∆ℓ2y ≤ s1(C)B [16], where s1(·) is the maximum singular value of a matrix. Various
mechanisms have been developed for enforcing differential privacy in the literature [6]. The Gaussian mechanism
requires adding Gaussian noise to outputs to mask systems’ state trajectories, and it can be useful in control
settings that are robust to Gaussian noise. We next provide a definition of the Gaussian mechanism in terms of the
Q-function, defined by Q (y) = 1√
2π
∫∞
y
e−
z2
2 dz.
Lemma 1. (Input Perturbation Gaussian Mechanism) Let ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. Let y ∈ ℓ˜q2 denote the
output of a system with state trajectories in ℓ˜n2 , and denote its ℓ2-norm sensitivity by ∆ℓ2y. Then the Gaussian
mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy takes the form
y˜(k) = y(k) + v(k),
where v is a stochastic process with v(k) ∼ N (0, σ2Iq), Iq is the q × q identity matrix, and
σ ≥ ∆ℓ2y
2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
where Kδ := Q−1 (δ) .
This Gaussian mechanism provides (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof: See [7, Corollary 1]. 
In words, the Gaussian mechanism adds i.i.d Gaussian noise point-wise in time to the output of a system to keep
its state trajectory private. We will use the Gaussian mechanism to enforce differential privacy for the remainder
of the paper.
B. Problem Formulation
Having covered the relevant privacy background, we now state the problem that is the focus of the paper.
Problem 1. Consider a system with publicly known mean initial condition xˆ−(0), and let it have dynamics
x(k + 1) = Hx(k) + w(k)
y(k) = Cx(k).
Keep the state trajectories of the system differentially private according to specified privacy parameters (ǫ, δ). Next,
investigate the effects of privacy in the following ways:
(a) Given privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), quantify the ability of the recipients of the privatized outputs to accurately
estimate the actual state trajectories of the system as a function of ǫ and δ.
(b) Develop guidelines for choosing the system’s privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) to achieve pre-specified bounds on
filter error. ⋄
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6We will examine Problem 1(a) by quantifying filtering error and entropy in terms of systems’ privacy parameters.
Problem 1(b) will then use these error bounds to inform how systems select their privacy parameters.
The initial state of the system is denoted by xˆ−(0) = E[x(0)], where the minus sign will be used to initialize a
Kalman filter which will be defined formally later. The next section presents our privacy implementation.
III. PRIVATE FILTERING IMPLEMENTATION
We consider scenarios in which systems share their privatized outputs with a recipient, such as a utility company
in a smart power grid or a traffic monitor in a smart transportation system. Abstracting away implementation details,
we simply say that a system sends its outputs to an aggregator, and this aggregator will run a Kalman filter. To
protect its own privacy, the system only shares its privatized outputs with the aggregator. The privatized outputs of
the system may also be received by other entities e.g., other systems in a network, adversaries, an eavesdropper,
and data analysts. Our results apply to these other recipients as well.
Without privacy, this transmission of data could reveal the system’s state trajectory, and, as a result, compromise
the system’s privacy. Hence, the system adds privacy noise at each time k to its output before sharing it, giving
y˜ (k) := y (k) + v (k) = Cx (k) + v (k) ,
where the privacy noise v (k) ∼ N (0, σ2Iq) as in Lemma 1. Introducing privacy naturally involves sacrificing a
level of accuracy in the shared data, and the trade-offs and effects of privacy need to be rigorously evaluated to
quantify the performance of private filtering.
The aggregator receives the privatized outputs of the system and implements a Kalman filter. The Kalman filter
minimizes the mean squared error (MSE) of both prediction and estimation for the systems studied in this paper,
which are linear systems with Gaussian noise. Mathematically, the Kalman filter minimizes both
E
[‖x(k)− xˆ−(k)‖2] and E[‖x(k)− xˆ(k)‖2],
where xˆ−(k) and xˆ(k) respectively denote the a priori state prediction and a posteriori state estimate of the Kalman
filter at time k. As noted in Problem 1, the term xˆ−(0) is assumed to be publicly known. We consider a steady-state
Kalman filter because we are interested in systems over long time horizons.
The update equation for the prediction step of the Kalman filter is evaluated as [17]
xˆ−(k + 1) = Hxˆ(k),
and the a posteriori state estimate xˆ(k) is updated as
xˆ(k + 1) = xˆ−(k + 1) + ΣCTV −1(y˜(k + 1)− Cxˆ−(k + 1)).
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7Assuming the observability of the pair (H,C) and controllability of the pair (A,D), where W = DDT , the a
posteriori error covariance matrix Σ is computed as
Σ = Σ− ΣCT (CΣCT + V )−1 CΣ
= (CTV −1C +Σ−1)−1. (1)
Here, the a priori error covariance matrix Σ is the unique positive semidefinite solution to the discrete algebraic
Riccati equation
Σ = HΣHT −HΣCT (CΣCT + V )−1 CΣHT +W
= H
(
Σ−1 + CTV −1C
)−1
HT +W. (2)
Under differential privacy, it is provably unlikely for the recipients of y˜(k) to distinguish a system’s actual
state trajectory from an adjacent one. In this setting, the Kalman filter minimizes the error in state prediction and
estimation in the mean square sense, which means it provides the optimal estimate of a private state trajectory.
Therefore, studying the connection between the Kalman filter and data privacy can elucidate fundamental limits of
information accuracy when dealing with private trajectories.
IV. QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF PRIVACY
In this section, we explicitly quantify the ability of the aggregator or any potential recipient of private data,
e.g., an adversary or an eavesdropper, to uncover the state trajectory of a system using its privatized outputs. One
natural way to do so is to bound the MSE of the prediction and estimation steps of a Kalman filter that processes
private data. Bounding these errors as functions of the system’s privacy parameters will directly connect the system’s
privacy levels to the accuracy with which the aggregator can estimate its state values. We proceed by developing
trace bounds for the a priori error covariance matrix Σ and the a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ, which are
equal to the MSE of the prediction and MSE of the estimate in the Kalman filter, respectively. Because the Kalman
filter in steady state minimizes both of these quantities, lower bounds on them are lower bounds on MSE for any
filtering strategy across long time horizons.
Toward doing so, the following lemma upper and lower bounds the trace of a matrix product. In it, we use
λn(K) ≤ · · · ≤ λ1(K) to denote the eigenvalues of the matrix K .
Lemma 2. Let K and S be n× n matrices. If K = KT ≥ 0 and S is symmetric, then
λn(S)tr(K) ≤ tr(KS) ≤ λ1(S)tr(K).
Proof: See [18, Fact 5.12.4]. 
We next have an analogous lemma for matrix sums.
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8Lemma 3. Let K and S be n× n Hermitian matrices. Then
λ1(K) + λn(S) ≤ λ1(K + S) ≤ λ1(K) + λ1(S)
λn(K) + λn(S) ≤ λn(K + S) ≤ λn(K) + λ1(S).
Proof: See [18, Theorem 8.4.11.]. 
To ease the presentation of the forthcoming results, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The matrix C is diagonal.
Below, we will repeatedly encounter the term CTV −1C, and we present bounds that we will use below. First
observe that
CTV −1C = diag
(
C211
σ21
, . . . ,
C2nn
σ2n
)
,
and we define 

l := argmin1≤i≤n
C2ii
σ2
i
u := argmax1≤i≤n
C2ii
σ2i
and then 

λn
(
CTV −1C
)
=
C2l
σ2
l
λ1
(
CTV −1C
)
=
C2u
σ2u
.
(3)
Next, we present lower and upper bounds for the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter as functions of
system’s privacy noise.
Theorem 1. The steady state a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter, equal to trΣ, is bounded via
trW +
σ2utr(H
TH)λn(W )
σ2u + λn(W )C
2
u
≤ trΣ ≤ trW + σ
2
l tr(H
TH)
C2l
.
Proof: The steady state MSE of the predictions of the Kalman filter is equal to the trace of the a priori error
covariance of the Kalman filter as given in Equation (III). Taking the trace of Equation (III), we obtain
trΣ− trW = tr
[
H(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1HT
]
= tr
[
HTH(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1
]
,
where we have used the cyclic permutation property of the trace. Next, we use Lemma 2 to write
trΣ− trW ≥ tr(HTH)λn
[
(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1
]
=
tr(HTH)
λ1 (Σ−1 + CTV −1C)
≥ tr(H
TH)
λ1(Σ−1) + λ1
(
CTV −1C
)
=
tr(HTH)
1
λn(Σ)
+ λ1
(
CTV −1C
) ,
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9where we apply Lemma 3 on the third line to split up the eigenvalues and use the fact that λ1(Σ
−1) = 1/λn(Σ) in
the final step. It is shown in [19, Theorem 3.1] that Σ ≥ W , and therefore λn(Σ) ≥ λn(W ). Using this fact and
Equation (IV), we find
trΣ− trW ≥ σ
2
utr(H
TH)λn(W )
σ2u + λn(W )C
2
u
,
which completes the first part of the proof. Similarly, by applying Lemmas 2 and 3 consecutively to Equation (III),
trΣ can be upper-bounded as
trΣ− trW ≤ tr(HTH)λ1
[
(Σ−1 + CTV −1C)−1
]
=
tr(HTH)
λn (Σ−1 + CTV −1C)
≤ tr(H
TH)
λn(Σ−1) + λn(CTV −1C)
≤ σ
2
l tr(H
TH)
C2l
,
where in the second step we have used λ1(M
−1) = 1/λn(M) and the third step uses Lemma 3 to split the eigenvalues.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 1 bounds the MSE of the aggregator’s prediction of a system, which quantifies the ability of the
aggregator to infer future states of the system. The following theorem presents similar bounds for Σ, which represent
the aggregator’s ability to determine the system’s current state.
Theorem 2. Suppose a system shares its privatized output trajectory, and the aggregator has all public information.
Then, the steady-state MSE of the a posteriori estimate of the system’s states is bounded by
nσ2u
C2u + σ
2
uλ
−1
n (W )
≤ trΣ ≤ n σ
2
l
C2l
.
Proof: The steady-state mean-squared estimation error E
[‖x(k) − xˆ(k)‖2] is equivalent to the trace of the
a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ in Equation (III). Using Lemma 2, a lower bound for the trace of Σ can
derived as
trΣ ≥ nλn
(
(CTV −1C +Σ−1)−1
)
=
n
λ1(CTV −1C +Σ−1)
≥ n
λ1(CTV −1C) + λ1(Σ−1)
=
n
λ1(CTV −1C) + 1λn(Σ)
≥ n
λ1(CTV −1C) + λ−1n (W )
=
nσ2u
C2u + σ
2
uλ
−1
n (W )
,
where in the second line we have used Lemma 3 to split the eigenvalues. In the second-to-last line, we use Σ ≥W
based on [19, Theorem 3.1] to use λn(Σ) ≥ λn(W ). Similarly, using Lemma 2, an upper bound for the trace of
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Σ can be derived as
trΣ ≤ nλ1
(
(CTV −1C +Σ−1)−1
)
≤ n
λn(CTV −1C +Σ−1)
≤ n
λn(CTV −1C) + λn(Σ−1)
≤ n
λn(CTV −1C)
,
where in the last line λn(Σ
−1) > 0 is eliminated. 
Together, the upper and lower bounds on tr(Σ) give MSE bounds which elucidate the balance between privacy
and accuracy of information shared with the aggregator.
Privacy and utility can be inherently conflicting goals, in the sense that the greater the level of privacy is, the less
useful information will generally be. To study this relationship, we use an information theoretic tool to investigate
the effects of the privacy noise v(k). In particular, we consider the differential entropy in the a posteriori estimates
xˆ(k) and a priori predictions xˆ−(k), which were defined in Section III. Shannon entropy has been used to investigate
the leakage of information while using differential privacy in other settings, for example in [8] and in distributed
linear control systems [20]. Differential entropy is useful for Gaussian distributions because it bounds the sub-level
sets of R−1, where R (y) = 1− 2Q (y), which is the volume of a covariance ellipsoid. Therefore, we will quantify
the effects of privacy noise upon the aggregator by studying how privacy noise affects ln det Σ and ln detΣ, which
are within an additive and multiplicative factor of the differential entropy of error in xˆ and xˆ−, respectively. Next,
we present log-determinant bounds for the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter.
Theorem 3. Suppose that
s21 (H) < 1 +
(
s2n (H)λ1 (Γ) + λn (W )
) · C2l
σ2l
where Γ = diag (γ1, . . . , γn), γi :=
σ2iWii
σ2
i
+C2
ii
Wii
, and s1(·) ≥ · · · ≥ sn(·) denote the singular values of a matrix. The
log-determinant of the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter can be upper-bounded as
ln detΣ <
(
σ2l λ1 (W )
σ2l + ηC
2
l − σ2l s21 (H)
) n∑
i=1
s2i (H) + trW,
where η := s2n (H)λ1 (Γ) + λn (W ) . Furthermore, the log-determinant of the a priori error covariance of the
Kalman filter can be lower-bounded as
ln det Σ ≥ ln
[
σ2u(detH)
2
σ2uλ
−1
n (W ) + C2u + σ
2
u lnn
+ det(W )
]
.
Proof: See [16]. 
Next, we derive bounds on the log-determinant of the a posteriori error covariance of the Kalman filter. To
facilitate the following analysis let us define the function
f (X) = X −XCT (CXCT + V )−1C, (4)
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where X = XT  0 is a variable and the matrices C and V were defined in Section II. We state the following
elementary lemmas that we will use below.
Lemma 4. If A ≻ 0 and B  0, then there exists t ≥ 0 such that tA ≥ B.
Proof: See [21, Lemma 3]. 
Lemma 5. For every t ≥ 0, we have f(tC−1V C−T )  C−1V C−T .
Proof : Inspired by the work in [21], let t ≥ 0. Then,
f(tC−1V C−T ) =
t
t+ 1
C−1V C−T  C−1V C−T . 
Lemma 6. Let S be an n× n Hermitian matrix. Then,
λmin(S)I  S  λmax(S)I.
Proof: See [18, Corollary 8.4.2]. 
We now present our log-determinant bounds for Σ.
Theorem 4. The log-determinant of the a posteriori error covariance of the Kalman filter is bounded via
n ln
(
σ2u
C2u + σ
2
uλ
−1
n (W )
)
≤ ln detΣ ≤ n ln
(
σ2l
C2l
)
.
Proof: Computing f(Σ) in Equation (IV), we get
Σ = f(Σ) = Σ− ΣCT (CΣCT + V )−1CΣ.
By Lemma 4, there exists a t ≥ 0 such that Σ  tC−1V C−T because Σ  0 by definition and C−1V C−T ≻ 0.
Since f is a monotonic function [21], we have f(Σ)  f(tC−1V C−T ), and therefore by Lemma 2,
Σ = f(Σ)  f(tC−1V C−T )  C−1V C−T .
Taking the log-determinant of both sides, we find
ln detΣ ≤ ln det (C−1V C−T ) = ln n∏
i=1
σ2
C2ii
≤ n ln
(
σ2l
C2l
)
.
Next, using Lemma 6, Equation (III) implies that
Σ  λn
(
(CTV −1C +Σ−1)−1
)
I
=
1
λ1(CTV −1C +Σ−1)
I 1
λ1(CTV −1C) + λ1(Σ−1)
I
 1
λ1(CTV −1C)+ 1λn(Σ)
I 1
λ1(CTV −1C)+λ−1n (W )
I, (5)
where, due to the similarity of the steps of this proof to the proof for Theorem 2, we have omitted the explanations
for each step. Using Equation (IV) and taking the log-determinant of the both sides of the Equation (IV), we can
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write
ln detΣ ≥ ln
[(
σ2u
C2u + σ
2
uλ
−1
n (W )
)n]
,
and the theorem follows. 
Of course, beyond merely studying the impacts of privacy, one can leverage these bounds to enable better privacy
parameter selection by tailoring privacy levels to attain a certain quality of information downstream. That is the
subject of the next section.
V. GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING PRIVACY PARAMETERS
In this section, we develop new guidelines for selecting privacy parameters, which will allow us to achieve
specified filtering error bounds. These bounds enable the calibration of privacy levels based on the desired accuracy
of those making decisions with private data, as well as individuals’ privacy desires. The value of the privacy
parameter δ is typically chosen to be small and fixed. The value of δ can be understood as the probability of
differential privacy failing to protect sensitive data, and it is therefore often [7] chosen in [10−5, 0.1] and we adopt
this for range for the rest of the paper.
Theorem 5. Suppose a system shares its privatized output trajectory and the aggregator has access to all public
information. Take δ ∈ [10−5, 10−1] and choose σ = ∆ℓ2y2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
. Suppose we want the steady state
MSE of predictions of the system’s next states, i.e., the a priori state predictions, to be in [Bl, Bu] for some bounds
Bl and Bu. A sufficient condition to do so is to bound ǫ via
1
8
(
1 +
√
36η3 + 1
η3
)2
≤ ǫ ≤ 1
η1
,
where
η1 :=
(
(Bl − trW )λn (W )C2u
(∆ℓ2y)
2
(tr(HTH)λn (W )−Bl + trW )
)1/2
and
η3 :=
(
(Bu − trW )C2l
(∆ℓ2y)
2
tr(HTH)
)1/2
.
Proof: First, choose ǫ ≥ 18
(
1+
√
36η3+1
η3
)2
and solve for η3 to get
9+
√
2ǫ
2ǫ ≤ η3. Taking δ ∈ [10−5, 10−1]
implies Kδ ∈ [1, 4.5]. As a result, we can write (2Kδ+
√
2ǫ)/2ǫ ≤ (9+√2ǫ)/2ǫ to get
2Kδ +
√
2ǫ
2ǫ
≤ η3.
Using the fact that
√
K + S ≤ √K +√S, substituting for η3, squaring both sides and rearranging, we have
(∆ℓ2y)
2
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
2ǫ
)2
≤ (Bu − trW )C
2
l
tr(HTH)
,
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which implies that σ2l ≤ (Bu−trW )C
2
l
tr(HTH)
. It then follows that
trW +
σ2l tr(H
TH)
C2l
≤ Bu,
which, by comparing to Theorem 1, implies that trΣ ≤ Bu.
Next, choose ǫ ≤ 1/η1. Given Kδ ≥ 1, we can write ǫ ≤ Kδ/η1, and, rearranging the terms, we find η1 ≤ Kδǫ .
Substitute for η1, square, and rearrange to get
(Bl − trW )λn (W )C2u
tr(HTH)λn (W )−Bl + trW ≤ (∆ℓ2y)
2
(
Kδ
ǫ
)2
.
Now, Kδǫ ≤
Kδ+
√
K2
δ
+2ǫ
2ǫ and therefore
(Bl−trW )λn(W )C2u
tr(HTH)λn(W )−Bl+trW ≤ (∆ℓ2y)
2
(
Kδ+
√
K2
δ
+2ǫ
2ǫ
)2
, which implies
(Bl − trW )λn (W )C2u
tr(HTH)λn (W )−Bl + trW ≤ σ
2
u.
Therefore,
trW +
σ2utr(H
TH)λn(W )
σ2u + λn(W )C
2
u
≥ Bl,
and by Theorem 1, choosing ǫ as above is sufficient to guarantee trΣ ≥ Bl. 
Theorem 5 presents upper and lower bounds for the privacy parameter ǫ which ensure that steady-state a priori
filtering error remains within acceptable bounds. Next, we provide analogous bounds on ǫ for a posteriori error.
Theorem 6. Suppose a system shares its privatized output trajectory and the aggregator has access to all public
information. Take δ ∈ [10−5, 10−1] and set σ = ∆ℓ2y2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
. Suppose we want the steady-state MSE
of the estimated states of the system, i.e., the a posteriori state estimates, to be contained in the interval [Bl, Bu]
for some bounds Bl and Bu. To do so, it is sufficient to choose the privacy parameter ǫ according to
1
8
(
1 +
√
36η4 + 1
η4
)2
≤ ǫ ≤ 1
η2
,
where
η2 :=
(
BlC
2
u
(∆ℓ2y)
2(n−Blλ−1n (W ))
)1/2
, η4 :=
(
BuC
2
l
n (∆ℓ2y)
2
)1/2
.
Proof: Choose ǫ ≥ 18
(
1+
√
36η4+1
η4
)2
and solve for η4 to get
9+
√
2ǫ
2ǫ ≤ η4. Choosing δ ∈ [10−5, 10−1] gives
Kδ ∈ [1, 4.5]. As a result, similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we can write (2Kδ+
√
2ǫ)/2ǫ ≤ (9+√2ǫ)/2ǫ to get
2Kδ +
√
2ǫ
2ǫ
≤ η4.
Because
√
K + S ≤ √K +√S, we can lower-bound the left-hand-side to write
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
2ǫ
≤ η4.
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Squaring, substituting in η4, and rearranging we get
(∆ℓ2y)
2
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
2ǫ
)2
≤ BuC
2
l
n
,
which is equivalent to σ2l ≤ BuC
2
l
n , which implies
nσ2l
C2
l
≤ Bu. Comparing this result to Theorem 2, we see that this
is sufficient for trΣ ≤ Bu.
Next, choose ǫ ≤ 1η2 . Given Kδ ∈ [1, 4.5], we may write η2 ≤ Kδǫ . We substitute for η2 and square both sides
to write
BlC
2
u
(∆ℓ2y)
2 (n−Blλ−1n (W )) ≤ (∆ℓ2y)2
(
Kδ
ǫ
)2
,
and therefore, by upper-bounding the right-hand-side and rearranging we write
BlC
2
u
n−Blλ−1n (W )
≤ (∆ℓ2y)2
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
2ǫ
)2
.
This in turn implies
BlC
2
u
n−Blλ−1n (W ) ≤ σ
2
u. Isolating Bl gives
σ2un
C2u+σ
2
uλ
−1
n (W )
≥ Bl, which, in light of Theorem 2, is a
sufficient condition to get trΣ ≥ Bl. 
Theorem 6 provides guidelines for choosing the privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), which allows a user to make informed
decisions for its level of privacy. We next demonstrate these bounds in practice.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this section, we simulate a system with state x(k) ∈ R2 for all k and dynamics
H =

 1 1
0 1

 , C =

 1 0
0 1

 , and W = 10I2×2.
We proceed to enforce input perturbation differential privacy as discussed in Section III. We choose (ǫ, δ) = (ln 3, 0.001),
which gives σ = 2.96. The privacy noise v (k) ∼ N (0, σ2I2×2) is added to the outputs y(k) at each time k. The
aggregator receives the private outputs pointwise in time and runs a Kalman filter, and we simulate this setup for
100 timesteps.
The results of this simulation are presented in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, we present the MSE bounds derived
in Theorem 1, and we compare them with the actual instantaneous a priori error. On average, the a priori error
in predictions of the system’s states remains within the given bounds; ephemeral bound violations are expected as
these bounds pertain to mean-square error. In Figure 2, we demonstrate the instantaneous error of the estimated
states of the system and we compare that with the upper and lower bounds derived in Theorem 2. As expected,
the instantaneous a posteriori error typically lies within the bounds derived in Theorem 2. Both plots illustrate our
bounds on the ability of an aggregator to predict or estimate the states of a system sharing privatized information.
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Fig. 1. The squared error of the prediction of the aggregator (solid line), the lower bound on prediction error as developed in Theorem 1 (dotted
line), the upper bound on prediction error in Theorem 1 (dashed line) over 100 timesteps. Although our bounds are developed for mean-squared
error, they hold at most timesteps for instantaneous error, and it is shown that on average the MSE lies within the bounds.
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Fig. 2. The squared error of the estimation of the aggregator on system’s states (solid line), the lower bound on estimation error as developed
in Theorem 2 (dotted line), the upper bound on estimation error in Theorem 2 (dashed line) over 100 timesteps. As in Figure 1, we see that
instantaneous a posteriori error also typically obeys our MSE bounds, and on average lies within the bounds, as shown here.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed new guidelines for calibrating the levels of privacy when enforcing differential
privacy in linear systems with Gaussian noise. These guidelines were chosen to attain desired filtering error bounds,
and novel bounds were presented for both filter entropy and filter error in terms of a system’s privacy levels. Future
work includes investigating general filtering techniques in which nonlinear systems are considered, with potential
applications in smart power grids and autonomous systems.
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